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Researchers are pursuing methods of securing the cyber aspect of the U.S. power 
grid, one of the country’s most critical infrastructures. An attacker who is able to 
infiltrate an Energy Management System (EMS) can instruct elements of the grid 
to function improperly or can skew the state information received by the control 
programs or operators. In addition, a cyber attack can combine multiple attacks 
and affect many physical locations at once. A study of the possible adverse effects 
an attack could generate can underline the urgency of improving grid security, 
contribute to a roadmap and priority list for security researchers, and advise on 
how defending against cyber attacks can differ from defending against point 
failures and physical attacks. In this paper I discuss the physical and cyber 
systems that compose the power grid, and I explore ways in which a compromise 
of the cyber system can affect the physical system, with a particular emphasis on 
the best means of creating large disturbances. Further, I consider ways in which 
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The U.S. power grid is the national network of electricity on which we depend in 
order to function. It is the solution to the enormous problem of how to get power 
from six thousand power plants to three hundred million people [1, 2]. It includes 
power generators, such as nuclear plants or wind farms, transmission networks, 
which move power from the generators to where it is needed, and local 
distribution networks, which move power from the transmission networks to 
businesses and homes. Despite its scale and complexity, the power grid is 
extremely reliable and resilient, and remarkably so, considering that it is 
happening in real time – power is consumed less than a second after it is 
produced. While it rarely fails, its scale and speed means that when it does fail, 
the failure can be quick and widespread. Also, the resiliency currently built into 
the power grid was mainly designed to deal with non-malicious events, such as 
equipment malfunctions or quick changes in demand, as opposed to malicious 
events caused by people attacking the grid. Given our dependency on electricity, 
failures are a serious concern.  
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The power grid is operated in real time because we do not yet know how to 
efficiently store power in large quantities and because it needs to be able to 
respond to real-time failures. Continuously gathering and analyzing data from the 
grid as well as responding to failures and changes in demand requires a large 
amount of cyber infrastructure. The power grid is managed by control stations 
that are connected to substations, switches, and sensors in arrangements termed 
SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) systems. These systems are 
increasingly using open system architecture and becoming networked: for 
instance, using IP to communicate between the control center and remote 
equipment or among equipment in a substation. One example that demonstrates 
the dangers of such a move is a 2002 penetration test by a cyber security firm for 
a California power company that at the time had four million customers, in 
which the testers parked a van outside a substation, connected to the 
substation’s open wireless local area network, and not only mapped the 
networked equipment in the control station but, “within 15 minutes, they 
mapped every piece of equipment in the operational control network. Within 20 
minutes, they were talking with the business network and had pulled off several 
business reports” [3]. 
 
 7 
Also, instead of controllers depending only on sensors placed on power lines 
between the controllers and other stations, they have much larger areas of 
control, receiving data from many lines and unmanned substations. This has 
enabled RTOs (regional transmission organizations) to oversee areas that include 
many power companies, states, and control stations, increasing the reliability of 
the grid. These advanced SCADA systems allow power companies to address a 
number of challenges, including: 1) predicting and quickly reacting to changes in 
demand on a large scale; 2) keeping waste to a minimum by holding fewer 
generation plants online and less spinning electric reserve (unused capacity 
provided by generators that are synchronized to the grid); 3) maintaining this 
stability with the increasing prevalence of green energy sources such as wind and 
solar that have intermittent supply; 4) dealing with generation in the distribution 
grid, for instance, homes with solar panels transferring excess power to the grid; 
and 5) interacting with new, “smart” home appliances in order to help reduce 
peaks in demand. 
 
The new smart technologies that are currently being integrated and will continue 
to be integrated into the U.S. power grid will introduce more vulnerability to 
attack. At a basic level, more sensors and controls will be networked together, 
 8 
and there will be more connections between those networks and the power 
company’s enterprise network, which in turn may be connected (although when 
connected, they are usually behind a firewall) to the Internet. The fact that some 
conceptualizations of the smart grid contain more networked devices than are on 
the Internet does not bode well for security in the smart grid, given that many 
Internet security problems are as yet unsolved. 
 
One challenge we face is examining what a successful attack can do to the power 
grid and how. This study’s importance is twofold: 1) to underline the importance 
of security for the power grid; and 2) to help security researchers determine and 
prioritize which parts of the system to protect. 
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2 Related Work 
While there are many assessments of power-grid cyber security and studies of 
cyber security improvements, there are none that go into depth on what can be 
done after some level of infiltration has been achieved. The largest published 
attack-scenario list appears in a study from Idaho National Laboratory, one of 
the main government labs researching power grid cyber security, and is simply a 
short, very general list. The first two items are, for instance, “Take direct control 
of devices in substations and/or generation plants, shutting these facilities down,” 
and, “Plant malicious code or a ‘logic bomb’ that executes on a given event or at 
a preselected time to disrupt the system” [4]. The authors do not elaborate on 
how the scenarios can be carried out and what the range of effects might be. 
Such brief attention to the subject is commonplace. Another paper on protecting 
power systems against electronic intrusions has a similar list, containing, for 
instance, the following scenarios: “Shut down the substation or any portion of the 
subsystem controlled by the compromised device, either immediately or in a 
delayed manner,” and “Gather control and protection settings information that 
could be used in a subsequent attack” [5].  
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More often than not in power grid security papers, the topic either is not 
examined at all or is given a sentence or two in the introduction in order to 
convey importance. One paper proposing a certain cyber-security-assessment 
approach simply lists the “affected components” as, “Electronic devices, IED’s 
[Intelligent Electronic Devices], Controllers or SCADA system” and “Data altered 
or destroyed, devices reset, communication blocked or re-routed” [6]. Another 
paper on cyber-security assessment contains the general warning, “Compromised 
cybersecurity of a SCADA system can cause serious impact to a power system if 
the attack is able to launch disruptive switching actions leading to a loss of load. 
This is particularly troublesome if the attack can penetrate the control center 
network that is connected to substations under the SCADA system” [7]. Instead, 
papers focus on other areas, such as methods of cyber infiltration, methods of 
cyber defense, and ways in which cyber security for the power grid differs from 
Internet security.  
 
This trend continues with newer publications that deal with the smart grid. The 
Department of Energy’s 2009 smart-grid cyber-security study devoted these two 
sentences to the consequences of a successful attack: “Many compromised Smart 
Meters or data collector nodes could be programmed by the attacker to 
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simultaneously send messages that cause power demand to be reduced 
dramatically and then to be increased dramatically. These phony messages could 
cause grid instability and power outages” [8]. While it does give an actual 
example of something that an attacker could manipulate, it does not describe 
possible variations of the attack, the possible scopes of disturbance, or other 
attack scenarios. This paper presents a more comprehensive, in-depth study of 
the topic. Some of the ideas I present do not appear in other publications, and I 
analyze the possibilities from a number of different angles, including possible 
effects, locations of attack, and interaction in concert with other ideas, with a 
focus on creating large, cascading outages. 
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3 Physical Infrastructure 
Electricity is produced by generators, which are connected to transmission lines. 
The electricity flows from the generators over the transmission lines to where the 
electricity is needed. The network of power lines that fans out, carrying 
electricity from the end of the transmission line to the many different customers 
in the area, is called the distribution grid. 
 
3.1 Generation 
The great majority of generators connected to the power grid are three-phase, AC 
(alternating current) generators. The generators basically consist of a magnet 
inside a hollow cylinder called a stator. Inside the surface of the stator there are 
three coils of wire. When the magnet rotates inside the stator, it creates a voltage 
that is supplied to customers, who then apply loads, which create currents in the 
coils of wire. Current is a measure of electrons moving down a wire, and electron 
movement is the electricity that powers electrical equipment such as lights and 
computers. Since the magnet is constantly rotating, the current in the wire is 
constantly alternating between electrons flowing first one way and then the other 
along the wire (hence the term ‘alternating current generators’). Further, each of 
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the three coils of wire wind through different parts of the stator. Thus at any 
given point in time the north end of the magnet is pointing in a different 
direction relative to each coil. Since the orientation of the magnet relative to the 
wire determines how the current changes in the coil, each wire’s coil’s current is 
alternating at different times. Each of the three coils and its associated current 
graph is termed a phase, which is why the generators are called three-phase 
generators.  
 
At the basic level, the rotating magnet makes electrons move back and forth 
across a wire, and those electrons power electrical equipment. The magnet is 
moved by the generator’s power source. For instance, in a wind generator, the 
wind turns the wind tower’s blades, which turn the magnet. In a hydropower 
plant, water turns the magnet, and in coal and nuclear power plants, water is 
heated to form steam, which turns the magnet. 
 
3.2 Transmission 
Two important measurements other than current are voltage and resistance.  
Voltage is a measure of the electrical force that moves the current along the wire, 
and the resistance of an object is a measure of the object’s opposition to current 
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flowing through it. All objects have resistance, including the wires carrying the 
electricity. The amount of power consumed by current passing through an object 
is determined by the amount of current and the object’s resistance. Take for 
example a battery and a light bulb, which are connected by a wire. Current flows 
from the battery, through the wire, and then through the light bulb. Since the 
goal is to produce light, we want most of the power to be spent by the light bulb, 
so we pick a wire that has low resistance. Since the wire has low resistance, only 
a small amount of power is consumed when the current travels over the wire, and 
then the light bulb, which has high resistance, consumes the remainder. 
 
In the power grid, the customers are often far away from the generators, so the 
power must be transmitted over power lines (which are simply thick wires) from 
the power plants to the customers. In order for this process to be efficient, we 
want only a small amount of power to be consumed by this transmission. We 
achieve this in part by choosing a type of wire that has low resistance (usually 
copper). However, recall that the amount of power used depends on both the 
amount of resistance and the amount of current. We could further decrease the 
power consumed by the power line by decreasing the current. One important 
equation governing the behavior of electric power is P=VI, where P is power, V 
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is voltage, and I is current. Given a certain amount of power coming from a 
generator, in order to lower the current, we must raise the voltage.  
 
This is precisely what is done in the power grid. Pieces of equipment called 
transformers are placed between a power plant and a transmission line, and they 
step up the voltage to a higher level, thereby decreasing the current. Substations 
are groupings of equipment based around transformers that have one or more 
power lines that come in at a certain voltage level, go through transformers, and 
go out on one or more lines at a different voltage level. For example, two power 
plants could have short lines going to a substation, which connects the lines and 
steps up the voltage for power to leave on a single long-distance, high-voltage 
transmission line. The other end of this long-distance line could, for instance, be 
at a substation that stepped down (lowered) the voltage to go out on two or more 
lower-voltage shorter-distance transmission lines.  
 
3.3 Distribution 
Transmission lines run to distribution substations, which step down the voltage 
from one or more lines so that the power can leave on a number of low-voltage, 
short-distance power lines to serve a certain group of customers, for instance, a 
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town. There will be further, smaller transformers located on power line poles that 
lower the voltage even more. For example, there may be a transformer on the 
pole in a house’s back yard that has a line going to the house and a line going to 
its neighbor and that lowers the voltage to a level that the house’s appliances can 
handle. 
 
3.4 Circuit Breakers 
Circuit breakers are devices that break the connection between two power lines, 
thereby stopping the flow of electricity between the lines. For example, at a 
substation A that had a high-voltage transmission line coming in and a low-
voltage distribution line going out, the transmission line would enter a 
transformer that stepped down the voltage, and then a short line would run 
between the transformer and a circuit breaker, and then the distribution line 
would run from the circuit breaker out of the substation. If the circuit breaker 
was triggered – for instance, automatically by a nearby relay or the control 
station due to the current in the line being too high or manually in order to 
perform line maintenance – the short line would be disconnected from the 
distribution line, and power would not be able to flow from the transmission line 
to the distribution line, so the power would have to find some other way to flow. 
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If substation A’s incoming transmission line originated in a substation B that had 
a second outgoing transmission line, all the power that would normally flow 
through the first transmission line would now have to flow through the second 
line.  
 
This large power flow change is the mechanism that enables cascading failures. 
Each power line has a certain maximum current capacity. When a line carries too 
much current, as the second transmission line may carry at the end of the above 
scenario, a circuit breaker on the line is automatically triggered, thus causing the 
power to flow on different line(s), some of which may consequently be 
overburdened, and so on. I will discuss cascading failures further later on in the 
paper. 
 
Circuit breakers are commonly located between generators and substations, at 
substations on both ends of transmission lines, and on various parts of 
distribution lines. They can be controlled locally by a relay or remotely by a 
control system. A relay is a device on a power line that takes a measurement, for 
instance, the current level, and in the case of a bad state sends one or more 
messages. For instance, if the current was too high the relay could send a 
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command to a nearby circuit breaker to open (disconnect the wires) and a 
message to the control station to notify it of the opened line. Relays and circuit 
breakers are an important protective measure in the power grid because high 
currents can permanently damage power equipment such as transformers and 
generators. 
 
A fuse is like a circuit breaker in that it disconnects two lines, but unlike a 
circuit breaker, it cannot automatically close (reconnect the lines together). A 
fuse is meant to protect equipment from higher currents than relay-controlled 
circuit breakers are meant to protect it from. It is simply a small section of the 
wire that is made of a different material – one that burns out when a high 
enough current passes through it, burns out, thereby creating a break in the line 
and interrupting the flow of power. 
  
3.5 Loads 
In AC power systems, not only the current, but also the voltage alternates back 
and forth, and they together produce two different types of power: real and 
reactive. Real power is produced when the current and voltage alternate at the 
same time, reactive power is produced when they alternate at completely 
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opposite times, and different amounts of both are produced when the current and 
voltage alternate at somewhat-overlapping times. On the side of the power 
system opposite generation, there are three types of devices, or loads, that use 
electricity. Resistive loads, such as light bulbs or electric ovens, run electricity 
through a high-resistance wire, which produces light and heat and consumes real 
power. Inductive loads, such as fans and vacuum cleaners, contain motors that 
generate magnetic fields and consume both real and reactive power. Capacitive 
loads, such as capacitors in the power supply of personal computers, are 
commonly said to produce reactive power.  
 
3.6 Compensators 
We use more inductive load than we do capacitive load, so the power grid has to 
compensate for consumers using more reactive power than the consumers 
produce. The two main types of compensators are capacitor banks, which produce 
reactive power, and reactors, which consume reactive power. Given the disparity 
in type of consumer loads, capacitor banks are more common. Both types of 
compensators are placed close to where they are needed, in the distribution 
network. Compensators can be controlled locally by a relay – for instance one on 
a distribution line that measures the reactive power level – and/or remotely 
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through a SCADA system. Reactive power is said to ‘support’ voltage: 
insufficient reactive power leads to voltage collapse – the loss of voltage in a large 
part of the system, which causes an outage.  
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4 Cyber Infrastructure 
A SCADA system, as the name states, involves both centralized control and data 
gathering. The main controls include a surprisingly small set of possible actions: 
changing generator output levels, opening and closing circuit breakers, changing 
transformer tap changers (devices in transformers or neighboring voltage 
regulators that alter the voltage level), and turning compensators on and off. The 
data include generation power output as well as a number of readings along 
power lines, such as real and reactive power levels, current levels, and voltage 
levels. RTU (Remote Terminal Unit) is a broad term that encompasses all 
devices that feed data to the SCADA system and can alter some part of the grid: 
for instance, a modern relay that both sends updates to the control center and 
can close and open a circuit breaker. RTUs can send their data to the control 
center in a number of ways, such as via fiber optics or microwave radio.  
 
An EMS (Energy Management System) encompasses a SCADA system as well as 
a number of different types of computer programs running on real-time data: 
automatic generation control, which changes generator output based on customer 
demand and the prices of buying power from or selling power to neighboring 
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companies; state estimation, which gathers data from all the RTUs to form a 
wide-area model of the state of the grid; contingency analysis, which continuously 
simulates what would happen if, for instance, an arbitrary line were to fail; 
automatic emergency load shedding, which cuts off load in order to preserve grid 
stability; and forecasting, which uses past load data and current weather data in 
order to predict future load.  
 
A control station that contains an EMS can cover as small an area as a city or 
county or as large an area as multiple states. A number of station computers 
usually perform the EMS tasks on one or two private local area networks (the 
second network put in place for redundancy), which in many cases are connected 
to the corporate network via a firewall. In addition to a second private network, 
there can also be backup computers ready to perform the necessary functions in 
case the main computers fail. Further, especially for control stations that serve 
large areas, there can be entire backup control stations that have duplicate EMS 
systems and that receive duplicated messages from each RTU.  
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5 Attack Scenarios 
5.1 Direct Signaling 
When one typically imagines an attack on the power grid, what typically comes 
to mind is blowing up generators or substations, or perhaps the easier task of 
interrupting the transmission at some point along the miles of unguarded power 
lines (by, for example, cutting the line or creating a short circuit), and perhaps 
performing a number of these actions at the same time in a number of key places 
(although such a task is much easier to achieve with a cyber attack) in order to 
cause a large, long-lasting outage. The first two examples of direct signaling, 
sending commands to generators and circuit breakers, are the cyber parallels to 
the above physical attacks, albeit usually not as long-lasting.  
 
5.1.1 Generators 
An EMS has to constantly keep a balance between the amount of power 
generated and the demand for power. Customers do not notify their power 
company in advance how much electricity they will be using and when. While 
future load amounts can be approximated to some degree, they can never be  
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in 
generation. They could infiltrate the generator’s local electronic control system in 
 
Figure 1: The main available actions in a power system. 
predicted perfectly. An EMS must continuously calculate the load on the system 
using data gathered at different points on the power lines. When there is more 
demand than power generated, the voltage sags (dips below the desired level) and 
there is a time window in which more power must be generated, or else a voltage 
collapse occurs. If attackers are able to make one or more generators either lower 
their output or shut down, they can create such an imbalance and perhaps a 
collapse.  
 
There are a number of ways in which attackers could trigger changes 
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order to send the “turn off” or “lower output” directives. Also, most generation 
control systems accept remote commands (this is what enables the automatic 
generation control that modern EMSs employ). If attackers could access the data 
link between an EMS and a generator or compromise the EMS itself, they may 
be able to send the generator commands.  
 
5.1.2 Circuit Breakers 
Each EMS controls many circuit breakers throughout the section of the grid 
under its purview. Opening a breaker on a line that carries power away from a 
generator (the top-left circuit breaker in Figure 2) removes that supply of power 
from the grid, just as shutting down the generator does. However, there are two 
new situations that opening breakers can create.  
 
The first situation is in a section of a distribution grid that is radially oriented, 
with a single substation supplying an area through lines that fan out from the 
substation, splitting at various points in order to reach each customer. When a 
breaker is opened in this situation, the breaker’s line loses power, as well as the 
lines that split away from that line and the customers on those lines. For  
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Figure 2: Example power grid diagram. 
instance, consider the town in Figure 2, but without Line B or the Capacitor  
Bank. The town’s power is supplied from a single substation (Substation C) that 
has five lines – one transmission line (Line A) that carries power to the 
substation and four distribution lines that carry power out of the substation and 
fan out to cover equally sized sections of the town. Opening a breaker on one of 
the four main distribution lines at a point close to the substation would cause a 
quarter of the town to be blacked out. This situation can be generalized to apply 
to any case in which the sole power source for a certain area is cut off. In the 
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example, the only power source to the one substation is Line A, so opening a 
breaker on that line would cut power off from the whole town. While almost 
every individual customer is served by a single load, large enough groups of 
customers, such as cities, have multiple transmission lines feeding their 
substations. 
 
The second situation is when the breaker opens a line that is not the sole supplier 
of power to anyone. Unlike the first case, customers do not immediately lose 
power, so the system load is unchanged. Thus power must be rerouted to reach 
the customers. However, in the majority of the grid, power cannot be intelligently 
routed or even at all actively routed. Given, for instance, a simple substation 
connected to a generator and two outgoing transmission lines (Substation A in 
Figure 2), the substation cannot alter how much power goes out on one line 
versus the other. The two transmission lines and the supply line coming from the 
generator are connected to each other via a bus, which is simply a thick rod of 
copper or aluminum. The distribution of power on the outgoing lines is 
determined by aspects of physical rules, such as the resistance of the wire and the 
load on the other end. There are new devices called FACTS controllers that 
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For an example of the second situation, consider a substation that supplies a 
town and has two incoming transmission lines (Substation C). Line A can carry a 
maximum 1000 MW (megawatt, equal to one thousand watts; a watt is a unit of 
power), and Line B can carry a maximum of 500 MW. The town at this point in 
time has a demand of 600 MW, and each line is supplying 300 MW. The 
attackers obtain the model of this section of the system and intelligently decide 
to open a breaker on Line A. This causes the full 600 MW needed by the town to 
attempt to flow through Line B, which is only rated to carry 500 MW. If the 600 
MW is permitted to flow through line B for a certain amount of time (which 
varies based on the type of cable and its safety margin), the line will be damaged. 
One possible scenario is that a power level higher than a line’s rating would not 
be permitted to flow through the line; a relay along the line would sense the 
power level jump and would immediately open a circuit breaker, preventing 
damage to the line. Another possible scenario is that the automatic line opening 
would be delayed, giving time for a computer program or human operator to 
selectively shed load. In this case, 100 MW or more of load in the town would be 
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shed by opening one or more distribution lines, disconnecting a portion of 
customers in order to keep line B providing power to the remainder of the town. 
 
This situation can also create a large cascading outage. The last example ends 
with the possibility of just the town out of power, but in the case of major lines 
in the middle of the transmission system, opening one line can first cause 
neighboring lines to overload, but then the power surges in another direction to 
try to get where it was going in a more roundabout way, but overloads those 
lines as well, etc.  
 
5.1.3 Compensators 
Capacitor banks and reactors can be switched off an on remotely and are 
automatically controlled by EMSs. Both also can be used maliciously to cause 
instability. The most common problem that compensators address is a dearth of 
reactive power. Switching off capacitor banks and switching on reactors can 
sharply diminish the supply of reactive power in the distribution network. Firstly, 
the lack of reactive power leads to voltage collapse. Secondly, reactive power 
must then be brought to where the demand is from generators via transmission 
lines, instead of it being locally produced by capacitors. This extra reactive power 
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traveling over the transmission lines contributes to the line’s total power, which 
may then approach or exceed the line’s power rating.  
 
5.1.4 Transformers 
Transformer tap changers can be remotely set to a different current-to-voltage 
ratio so that the outgoing voltage is outside of the bounds of normal levels. For 
instance, if the change is made in a location for which there are no other 
incoming power sources between it and loads, as in the first circuit breaker 
situation discussed in section 5.1.2 above, then a lowering of the voltage would 
produce a voltage sag everywhere down the line (or lines if the line splits). 
Voltage sags can adversely affect electrical devices, including causing them to 
reset. The more sensitive types of devices, such as computers and process control 
machinery, can be affected – for instance can be reset – when the voltage sags as 
little as ten percent. Since such devices are the backbone of the nation’s critical 
infrastructures, voltage sags are a serious concern. Of even more concern would 




The situation changes if the alteration is made in a location that is not along the 
line of a sole power supply to a group of customers. If a single change is made, it 
is likely that at some point down the line when the power is combined with 
another incoming source that the voltage dip will be absorbed to a large degree. 
However, if most or all voltages are lowered on lines entering a certain area, then 
the instability could persist. Further, if the voltages can be lowered on a group of 
long-distance, high-powered transmission lines, then a much larger region could 
experience instability and even a cascading outage.  
 
5.1.5 Signaling Methods 
The four parts of the power grid discussed above are the main items that an 
EMS controls. There are various points in the system from which each of these 
parts can be given commands to change the state. Gaining access to a 
substation’s communications network would allow attackers to send messages 
directly to the substation’s transformers, circuit breakers, and compensators. 
Another point of entry is the line of communication between the equipment and 
the control station. If attackers can gain access to a line of communication, they 
can inject false commands to the equipment. For some companies – in particular, 
those that have one control center overseeing a large area – equipment 
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communication lines are consolidated by area before being sent (for example, via 
a dedicated T1 line) to the control center. These communication hubs can also be 
compromised.  
 
The last point of entry is the control center. If attackers were able to access the 
control center’s communications hub, they could send the commands directly out 
on the wire. If not, they might be able to alter the behavior of the manager 
program – for instance, through code injection or configuration file modification – 
which extrapolates the current grid power flow model from the incoming data 
and sends out automatic corrections, so that the program sends the attackers’ 
desired commands via the communications hub. Also, instead of altering the 
behavior of the manager directly, they could alter values in the database the 
program uses to form its model of the grid’s current state. For instance, 
artificially raising the datum corresponding to the measured voltage on a line 
may incite the manager to automatically correct the perceived problem by 
signaling the transformer to lower the voltage.  
 
This same effect can be reached through modifying the data that RTUs send to 
the control station rather than the modifying the data after it reaches the control 
 33 
station. For instance, in Figure 2 the attackers could compromise the power plant 
and substations and change the data that is sent from those locations to the 
control center. This method may be preferred for ease of entry – the substations 
may be easier to electronically break into than the control center – or for 
persistence – compromising the substations may be harder to detect and fix than 
compromising the control center. Such attacks were formerly considered to be 
largely or even fully impeded by algorithms used by state estimators to account 
for erroneous sensor measurements. However, a recent paper by Liu et al. [10] 
reveals how to create attacks that “successfully introduce arbitrary errors into 
certain state variables while bypassing existing techniques for bad measurement 
detection.” While it may be difficult to obtain the degree of system configuration 
knowledge necessary for the proposed attacks without having compromised the 
control center, such information could be acquired through means other than 
cyber attack. One non-malicious example of an EMS performing a detrimental 
action based on bad data can be found in NERC’s (North American Electric 
Reliability Corporation) archive of system disturbances. NERC publishes a yearly 
summary of disturbances that power companies are required to report to it, and 
the 2007 report describes an incident where an EMS disconnected 98,700 
customers, saying that it was “triggered by the status change of several dynamic 
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transfer signals to telemetry error which biased the calculated load higher than 
the target load set in the load shed application” [11]
5.2 Scope of Effect 
5.2.1 Distance 
Out of the different parts of the power grid, attacking the transmission section of 
the grid would create the largest effect. Many of the original long, high-voltage 
transmission lines that connect different regions of the country were put in place 
for safety reasons, to help with emergencies. They were not meant for the 
continuous high usage that they experience today, with many regions getting all 
or most of their electricity from remote generators. For instance, a large portion 
of the electricity used by the Northeastern United States comes in around the 
clock on long transmissions lines from hydroelectric plants.  
 
Since many of the effects of physical attacks can also be created by cyber attacks, 
methods of determining the best places for physical attack, such as the method 
put forth by Salmeron et al. [12] [13], can also be used to plan cyber attacks. 
There have been a few studies that conclude that transmission is the most 
vulnerable section of the grid. Albert et al. [14] create and analyze a model of 
the current U.S. grid from a graph theory perspective and find that “disturbances 
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affecting key transmission substations greatly reduce [the power grid’s] ability to 
function.” The insufficiency in transmission capability has long been recognized, 
and in 2005 Congress authorized the Department of Energy to create National 
Interest Electric Transmission Corridors – regions with high transmission 
congestion in which the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has the power to 
make compulsory purchases of land in order to construct new transmission lines. 
While two National Corridors were created in 2007 – one in the Mid-Atlantic and 
one in southern California and western Arizona – routes for new lines have not 
yet been chosen. The Department of Energy’s 2009 National Electric 
Transmission Congestion Study [15] says of the Mid-Atlantic corridor, “little 
new transmission has been built in the region in the past three years.” Not only 
has the situation not improved, but the study also states that the region “has 
added new generation since 2006,” exacerbating the congestion problem.  
 
An excellent example of a large blackout caused by a cascade over transmission 
lines is the Northeast blackout of 2003, which put the majority of eight states as 
well as Ontario, Canada out of power. It began with the unplanned shutdown of 
a power plant in Ohio. Over the next two hours, the circuit breakers on a few 
high-voltage transmission lines opened, mostly due an unusually high current 
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causing the lines to sag and come into contact with trees. This contact created a 
short circuit, which caused a very high current in the power line, which was 
detected by a relay, which automatically opens a breaker on the line. After 
approximately two hours, the overcurrent and undervoltage conditions were so 
severe that an entire swath of transmission lines quickly tripped out. This 
separated a region of power plants to the west from eastern demand, causing the 
power plants to go offline. The eastern region then experienced a surge of power 
from the far east, further tripping transmission lines and taking far east 
generators offline.  
 
Current EMSs do not adequately prevent maliciously caused cascading outages. 
This inadequacy is due in part to their N-1 contingency analysis systems. An N-1 
contingency analysis program continuously runs scenarios in which one piece of 
the grid goes down – for instance, a transmission line or a generator – to make 
sure that the grid is able to return to a stable state. A system designed to 
respond to single-point failures is insufficient, however, since attacks can easily 
create more than one contingency at once. One physical phenomenon that 
similarly creates multiple failures at once is a storm that causes geomagnetic field 
disturbances. One example is the 1989 collapse of the Quebec hydro grid, which 
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experienced seven contingencies in 57 seconds [16]. While N-2 or greater systems 
do exist, they are rarely used. Instead, sometimes if-then statements are added to 
the program, such as, “if transmission line X fails, generator Y usually does as 
well,” based on the prior experience of the operators, but these small additions to 




The magnitude of an event can be measured in time as well as distance. In the 
first circuit breaker example of section 5.1.2, opening one distribution line leaves 
a fourth of the town without power. However, it would be a relatively small 
outage if the breaker was automatically reclosed a second later. Two possible 
methods of prolonging a malicious change made to the system are to continue re-
sending the original message, and to prevent further commands from being sent 
to the altered device, whether it be by crashing the control program or blocking 
the communications line.  
 
When a generator is shut down, its downtime is longer than that of a line. A line 
in many cases can simply be switched on, whereas a generator must be started, 
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which can take a few hours for coal power plants or an entire day for nuclear 
plants. Also, many power plants need power in order to start. If the disturbance 
affects a wide area, including the power lines connected to the shut-down 
generators, then the generators must be black started in order to bootstrap the 
power grid back into working order. The process begins with those generators 
that have diesel generators that can be connected to the plant for this very 
purpose, and then incrementally with the other generators, using the power 
generated by the first set, all the while connecting the exact amount of load to 
the system in order to balance out the amount of power being generated. When 
the area is large and lies across company boundaries, the process of coordinating 
the startup can be an enormous task. Restoring power following the 2003 
Northeast blackout took over forty-eight hours.   
 
The delicacy of this bootstrapping process suggests a method of prolonging an 
outage even further. If the control center can be compromised and remain so (the 
attacker could, for instance, implant intelligent code that could continue to 
attack even after the attacker’s connection to the control center has been cut), 
then the bootstrapping process can be sabotaged more easily due to the simpler 
model of the emerging system. At the beginning, for instance, it is only one 
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black-started generator supplying a small load. Taking out, say, the one 
transmission line between that generator and its load returns the grid to a 
complete blackout.  
 
One advantage that a cyber attack has over a physical attack is its ability to 
continue and hide past the point a physical attack could. The physical attackers 
of a control station or substation cannot remain and wait to perform the same 
attack – police officers or members of the armed forces will come to investigate 
and guard the area. A cyber attack may not be recognized as an attack 
immediately – it could seem to be a software error – and may take a substantial 
effort to stop. Breaking the line of cyber entry, for instance, would not prevent 
malicious programs from being left behind, scanning the machine for malicious 
code may not find it, and wiping and reinstalling the machine performing power 
flow analysis, for instance, would not prevent malicious programs on other 
machines on the local network from spreading back to the power flow machine. 
Large power companies often have a redundant backup control center, and they 
may switch over to that facility in the event of a cyber attack. However, if the 
cyber attack was distributed – for example, via a number of substations – this 
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control center switch would not help, and it may take quite a while to identify 
the compromised substations and vet their equipment. 
 
Another way in which time plays into the size of the event is the state of the 
power grid at the instant in which the attack is carried out. An attack can be 
more effective – more likely to cause a cascading outage, for instance – if the 
system is under stress to begin with. The peak load times are always during 
extreme hot or cold weather due to the heightened use of air conditioning and 
electric heating, respectively. Of the two, extreme heat creates the greater load, 
because the common methods of heating buildings depend less on electricity. 
Thus attackers can simply look at the weather forecast to choose a time that will 
increase their chance of success.  
 
An even more accurate method of determining the current system load is by 
looking it up online. RTOs that manage the deregulated open-market power 
system must provide availability and prices to the companies in the area. Of 
those that provide a web interface, most require registration; however, at least 
one major wholesale power provider does not require registration. CAISO, the 
Califonia Independent System Operator, has a real-time, publicly-available online 
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system named OASIS (Open Access Same-time Information System), which 
provides real-time transmission loads [18].  
 
Weather can be used not only to estimate the system load, but also to predict 
when there may be natural damage to the system that could complement the 
attacker’s efforts: lightning striking power lines can create voltage surges; lighting 
or wind can cause trees or branches to knock lines and line poles over and create 
short circuits; and wind blowing lines against nearby trees can cause short 
circuits. Weather is by far the largest cause of damage to the grid, and large 
storms can cause a lot of damage. Both looking up regional loads, in cases when 
it is accessible, and paying attention to weather are helpful to choosing the 
timing in both physical and cyber attacks. However, the most accurate view of 
the state of the grid is obtained by looking at the real-time data gathered by the 
target region’s EMS, which is only possible in a cyber attack.  
 
The most long-lasting effect, however, is attained through permanently damaging 
equipment. While damaging equipment is much more likely to occur in a physical 
attack, it is still possible in a cyber attack. There is the commonly-cited  
possibility of taking control of a generator’s control system and, say, cranking up 
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generation above the capacity of the machinery, raising heat and pressure to the 
blowing point. An attacker could also maintain a short circuit through a 
combination of cyber and physical means: if a short circuit is created, either by 
an attacker or a storm, circuit breakers on the line would usually trip. However, 
an increasing percentage of breakers can be remotely controlled. If an attacker 
could send commands to breakers to stay closed while the line is, for instance, in 
contact with the ground, then the extremely high current that comes with a short 
circuit could damage equipment along the line. Transformers – in particular, 
large ones on high-voltage transmission lines – would be a prime target, although 
many have fuses that would prevent the high current from continuing through 
the device for more than an instant. A less likely target would be the heart of 
generators, since there are almost always protective elements between the line 
and the stator. However, transformers are a large enough target themselves. 
While companies have modest stockpiles of extra smaller transformers, such as 
the ones used in the distribution grid, there are not many spare large 
transformers. If enough were damaged, new ones would need to be manufactured, 
which could take half a year.  
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5.3 Human Operators 
While in contemporary times the everyday running of the power grid is done 
automatically by EMSs, there are still human operators sitting all day and night 
in the main control room in front of a large mapboard – a display that represents 
the current state of the region of the grid for which the control station is 
responsible. Although their usual responsibilities involve non-emergency 
situations, such as coordinating scheduled line outages for maintenance, they are 
trained to respond to emergency situations.  
 
One element behind the magnitude of the 2003 Northeast blackout was an error 
in the EMS run by the company that oversaw the area where the cascade began. 
In particular, this error delayed the alarm from going off for over an hour. During 
this delay the mapboard showed the system in fine working order. This caused  
the operators to not only not notice the problems and thus not take any 
corrective action, but also to ignore calls from neighboring control centers asking 
them about the instability emanating from the faulty control area. The final 
report on the blackout from the U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force 
[19] determined that there was a large window of time in which corrective 
actions could have been taken. If the control center’s EMS had been working 
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correctly, the control center operatives would have been notified of the problems 
with the grid and would most likely have taken corrective actions that would 
have prevented the massive cascading outage. 
 
The 2003 Northeast blackout example clearly suggests a factor that would greatly 
improve the chances of an attack’s widespread success: preventing control center 
operatives from taking corrective measures. Many in the industry believe that a 
cyber attack at a given control station is no worse than a physical attack there. 
However, imagine a control station being subject to a silent cyber attack, in 
which the station managers do not know that their station is compromised. The 
attacker creates a dangerous imbalance in the grid but makes sure that the 
control system software continues to give normal readings. When neighboring 
controllers call the compromised station, they are told that everything is under 
control, and the problem has time to grow, perhaps enough to create a larger 
cascading failure. 
 
The attack method of changing what control center operators see suggests 
another idea: create imaginary problems in the system designed to prompt the 
operator to perform a ‘corrective’ action that the attacker desires. The same 
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reason/action pairings listed in Figure 1 that can be used when sending 
imaginary bad data to an EMS can be used here. While most of the changes in 
the grid are made by the EMS control software, sometimes the decision is left up 
to the operator. For instance, in one EMS, some problems are presented to the 
operator along with possible fixes and the time by which a corrective action must 
be taken to avoid damaging equipment. There must be some point at which this 
method will not work, when the operators realize that, for instance, the data they 
see is too illogical to be real. However, as one control center manager states, 
“Status of devices is gospel” [17]. It may take quite some time or strange 
circumstances for an operator to begin questioning the validity of the data 
coming from the grid’s trusted devices. 
   
5.4 Intercompany Interactions 
Often neighboring companies share their real-time data amongst themselves, via, 
for instance, ICCP (Inter-Control Center Communication Protocol). This 
suggests other data-obscuring attack vectors similar to those described for within 
a company. Data sent from an attacked control center to the neighboring centers 
could be modified to hide the instability, thereby giving it more time to 
exacerbate. On the other hand, attackers could send imaginary bad data from 
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one control center to another in order to evoke an action in the latter’s center. If, 
for instance, it is easier to infiltrate control station A than it is B, the target 
station, then the attackers could send incorrect instable data from A to B so that 
B cuts its section of the grid off from A’s section as a protective measure, which 
would cause some degree of instability in B’s section. For example, if there was 
power flowing to B’s region from A’s region, then separating the two regions 
would lower the power supply in B’s region, which would lower the voltage until 
load was shed or local generation was increased.  
 
Presenting false normal data in order to prevent corrective measures is important 
not only within a company and between companies, but also between the 
company and the RTO, which often also has a station that continually receives, 
analyzes, and monitors real-time data from the companies in its purview. In the 
2003 Northeast blackout there was a problem not only with the original control 
room’s EMS alarm, but also with the RTO’s EMS: the RTO’s state estimator 
had not been restarted after maintenance that day. If the RTO had had a 
working state estimator, its operator would have noticed the irregular state of the 




In this paper I explain the basics of the power grid’s electrical and cyber 
infrastructures and discuss ways that attackers could subvert the grid’s normal 
operations and controls either directly (via electronic commands) or indirectly 
(via injecting false data to get the EMS control software or human operator to 
take harmful seemingly-corrective action). I also discuss the following items: the 
points in the system that can be compromised; using cyber attacks to create 
permanent physical damage; affecting larger areas through cascading outages; 
choosing an initial attack time based on load derived from weather, RTO data, 
and/or EMS data; and creating longer-lasting disturbances by crippling the 
control systems or the bootstrapping process or by manipulating the state 
information received by the control programs or operators located at the control 
center(s) of the companies in the attack area, their neighbors, and their RTO. 
The latter two topics are unique to cyber attacks; further, the multiple 
simultaneous contingencies required to incite a cascading outage are much easier 
to create via a cyber attack than via a physical one. 
 
Much needs to be done to improve the security of the power grid. Important 
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initial steps would include: 1) reduce the possibility of cascading outages through 
increasing the number of transmission lines, further study of such outages from a 
systems and power engineering perspectives (such as Dobson et al. [20]), 
introducing FACTS controllers to substations, and improving contingency 
algorithms (such as in Mili et al. [21] and Motter [22]); and 2) prevent false 
data injection through adapting some of the many mechanisms that are used in 
computer security when certain entities in a system are not trusted, such as 
encryption and signatures. 
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